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  • Why Environmental Philosophers Should Be 'Buck-Passers' about Value Stabell, Espen Dyrnes 2021 Environmental Ethics , Vol. 43 , Issue 4 , S. 339 ff. ( Zeitschrift ) Englisch 0163-4275 | 2153-7895 10.5840/enviroethics202211434 Abstract

    The value of nature has been extensively debated in environmental ethics. There has been less discussion, however, about how one should understand the relation between this value and normativity, or reasons: if something in nature is seen as valuable, how should we understand the relation between this fact and claims about reasons to, for example, protect it or promote its existence? The “commonsense” view is that value gives rise to reasons. The buck-passing account of value (BPA), on the other hand, implies that for an entity or state of affairs in nature to be valuable just is for it to have properties (other than that of being valuable) that provide reasons to promote or have a pro-attitude towards it. BPA has been extensively debated, but has received little attention in environmental philosophy. In this paper, it is argued that the view suggests a “reasons first” approach to environmental ethics, and that it should be preferred to competing accounts of value in the context of environmental ethics.

    Schlagwörter

    Applied Philosophy | Business and Professional Ethics | Contemporary Philosophy | General Interest | Social and Political Philosophy | Social Science