In Experience and the Absolute (2004) and other works, Jean-Yves Lacoste develops a phenomenology of a way of life he calls "liturgy," in which one refuses one's being-in-the-world in favor of a more basic form of existence he calls "being-before-God." In this essay I argue that if there is indeed such a thing as being-before-God, Lacoste has not sufficiently considered the possibility that it is characterized in part by a disturbance of one's being-in-the-world similar to, or perhaps even identical with, the disruptive encounter with the human other that constitutes the self as responsible according to Levinas's unique notion of ethics. Lacoste's dismissal of Levinas, evidently based on a misunderstanding of what Levinas means by the word "ethics," leads him to overlook the potential relevance of Levinas's ideas to his phenomenological project at a number of significant points in his work.