• Introspective Distinguishability : Who Needs It? Schönbaumsfeld, Genia 2021 Midwest Studies in Philosophy , Vol. 45 , S. 241 ff. ( Zeitschrift ) Englisch 0363-6550 | 1475-4975 10.5840/msp202110712 Abstract

    It is generally thought that if introspective distinguishability (ID) were available, it would provide an answer to scepticism about perceptual knowledge by enabling us to tell the difference between a good case perceptual experience and a bad kind. This paper challenges this common assumption by showing that even if ID were available, it would not advance our case against scepticism. The conclusion to draw from this result is not to concede to scepticism, however, but rather to give up on the idea that ID is required for knowledge. For if perception with ID turns out to get us no further than perception without ID, then the rational thing to do is to realize that the putative presence (or absence) of ID is a red herring in the debate about scepticism and can make no difference to the question of whether or not perceptual knowledge is possible.

    Schlagwörter

    Analytic Philosophy | Contemporary Philosophy

Schönbaumsfeld, Genia
Analytic Philosophy
Contemporary Philosophy

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