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  • MacIntyre on Practical Reasoning : A Reply to Patrick Byrne Bernacchio, Caleb 2021 International Philosophical Quarterly , Vol. 61 , Issue 4 , S. 481 ff. ( Zeitschrift ) Englisch 0019-0365 | 2153-8077 10.5840/ipq2022330181 Abstract

    Patrick Byrne argues that MacIntyre’s account of practical reasoning is inadequate because it is based upon a notion of flourishing that places too much emphasis on impersonal facts, likewise because it is excessively focused on means without considering the role of desire for ends, and because it is does not account for the role of feelings in explaining how knowledge of ends is attained. In this essay, I argue that MacIntyre’s account provides adequate responses to each of these concerns. But more broadly, I argue that Byrne is right to suggest that a Lonerganian perspective offers important insights that can extend MacIntyre’s neo-Aristotelian practical philosophy. Specifically, Lonergan’s account of the generalized empirical method may inform MacIntyre’s theory of rival, and potentially incommensurable traditions, explaining how standards of argument are both transcultural and historically articulated.

    Schlagwörter

    Catholic Tradition | Contemporary Philosophy | History of Philosophy

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