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  • The Problem of Reality in the Philosophy of Science by T. Kuhn Serkova, Vera A. 2022 Epistemology & Philosophy of Science , Vol. 59 , Issue 4 , S. 221 ff. ( Zeitschrift ) Russisch 1811-833X | 2311-7133 Abstract

    The purpose of this article is to clarify the importance of questions about the nature of reality for understanding the basic ideas of Thomas Kuhn’s philosophy of science. For Kuhn, the topic of reality is not "too metaphysical" and therefore undesirable, as for the neo-positivists, although in a certain sense it is “premature” and will emerge later in the discussions of realists and anti-realists in full measure. The ontological meaning of the problem of the relationship between science and reality appears in Kuhn’s works as a side topic of his epistemological research. The first part of the paper analyzes Kuhn’s statements about reality and determines his ontological position; the second part considers how the problematic of reality was clarified in his polemic with his critics, who either, like K. Hempel, turn Kuhn to clarify some points of his ideas about reality, or, like M. Masterman, give their interpretation of his ideas, with which he agrees. The third part of the paper shows how Kuhn’s anti-realism is reflected in his epistemological and methodological understanding of objectivity and truth in science. The conclusion of the paper is that Kuhn’s epistemological skepticism is becoming increasingly evident to himself and his critics, and his anti-realist ontological position becomes apparent against this background.

    Schlagwörter

    Contemporary Philosophy | Philosophy of Science

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