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  • When that F is not F. Interpretability, Deixis and Complex Demonstratives Gimeno-Simó, Joan 2022 Epistemology & Philosophy of Science , Vol. 59 , Issue 2 , S. 152 ff. ( Zeitschrift ) Englisch 1811-833X | 2311-7133 10.5840/eps202259230 Abstract

    In this paper I defend two claims regarding complex demonstratives (noun phrases of the form “that F”). On the one hand I argue that, when one of these expressions misdescribes the referred object (i.e., when such object is not F), the right semantic analysis is to treat the expression as uninterpretable. On the other, I claim that the uninterpretability thesis finds itself in trouble when it comes to dealing with non-deictic uses of complex demonstratives, i.e., uses of “that F” in which the speaker has no acquaintance or direct perception of any object that could satisfy the predicative material. In order to make these two claims compatible, I set out to modify the way the uninterpretability thesis has been traditionally formulated.

    Schlagwörter

    Contemporary Philosophy | Philosophy of Science

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