• The Filmic Representation of ‘Relived’ Experiences Liefke, Kristina 2022 Epistemology & Philosophy of Science , Vol. 59 , Issue 2 , S. 56 ff. ( Zeitschrift ) Englisch 1811-833X | 2311-7133 10.5840/eps202259221 Abstract

    This comment discusses Emar Maier’s argument against the characterization of unreliable filmic narration as (first-)personal narration. My comment focuses on two assumptions of Maier’s argument, viz. that the narrating character’s mental states can be described independently of other mental states/experiences and that personal filmic narration can only proceed from a de se perspective (as captured by first-person shots). I contend that the majority of movies with unreliable narration represents an experientially parasitic mental state (typically, the character’s remembering – or ‘reliving’ – a defining personally experienced event). Since these states are well-known to involve perspective-shifting and various kinds of semantic enrichment, unreliable filmic representation is perfectly compatible with the presence of a personal narrator.

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    Contemporary Philosophy | Philosophy of Science

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Liefke, Kristina
Contemporary Philosophy
Philosophy of Science

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