• Against Mind-Dependence Ruloff, Cp 2014 Philo , Vol. 17 , Issue 1 , S. 92 ff. ( Zeitschrift ) Englisch 1098-3570 | 2154-1639 10.5840/Philo20141716 Abstract

    Paul Gould has recently defended Quentin Smith’s conceptualist argument for a single omniscient mind by developing a sub-argument for a crucial premise of Smith’s argument, namely, a premise that asserts that, nec­essarily, for any proposition p, p must be the effect of a mind. In this paper, I argue via reductio that Gould’s argument for this particular premise fails.

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    Philosophy and Religion

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Ruloff, Cp
Philosophy and Religion

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