Theories of ethics that attempt to incorporate divine speech or commands as necessary elements in the construction of moral obligations are often viewed as vulnerable to a challenge based on the so-called Euthyphro dilemma. According to this challenge, opponents of theistic ethics suppose that divine speech either informs one of a preexisting set of values and obligations, which makes it inconsequential, or is entirely arbitrary, which makes it irrational. This essay analyzes some of the debates on the nature of divine commands in eleventh-century works of Islamic jurisprudence (uṣūl al-fiqh). I show that Mu̔tazilī jurisprudents advanced the view that divine commands were actions performed in time that had concrete manifestations, while Ash̔arīs argued that divine speech in general, and commands in particular, were eternal divine attributes. After exposing certain weaknesses in the Euthyphro-inspired objections to theistic ethics, I argue that the Ash̔arī idea of commands as divine attributes is a promising move for scholars interested in defending a divine command view of moral obligation.