• Indeterministic Choice and Ability Haji, Ishtiyaque | Hebert, Ryan 2018 The Journal of Ethics , Vol. 22 , Issue 2 , S. 191 ff. ( Zeitschrift ) Englisch 1382-4554 | 1572-8609 10.2307/45205036 Abstract

    The problem of luck is advanced and defended against libertarian theories of responsibility-enabling ability. An outline of an account of ability is articulated to explore some features of the sort of ability moral responsibility requires. The account vindicates the luck objection and suggests a novel puzzle: Libertarianism is structurally barred from answering the problem of luck because responsibility requires, but inherently lacks, an explanation from reason states to actions that preserves reliability of connection between responsibility-grounding reasons-sensitivity and action.
Haji, Ishtiyaque
Hebert, Ryan

  • keine lizenzierten Inhalte